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Abstract
The author provides a philosophical and moral evaluation 
of a number of arguments against and in favour of 
posthumanism. Some of the arguments explored are: the 
claim that current evils are necessary to maintain our 
humanity; Sandel’s association of radical enhancement 
with the striving for mastery and perfection; psychological 
concerns about posthumanism; the “simple conservative 
argument” (Buchanan); the idea of unlimited longevity; 
as well as possible issues in the relationship between 
unenhanced people and posthumans. The author defends 
the idea that radical enhancements are justified in view 
of the possible lag of natural selection to select desirable/
necessary current human traits. He also rejects the idea 
that “human nature” ought to be regarded as a moral 
desideratum. His conclusion is that the possibility of 
radical (also biomedical) human enhancements does not 
warrant blanket moral approval or disapproval. We ought 
to see what specific possibilities arise, and then judge 
those possibilities on their own, specific merit.
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Homo sapiens sapiens has, as a distinct species on this 
planet, evolved over the past two to three million years. 
What we are as a species today, is the outcome of the 
process of evolution based on natural selection – a process 
over which no living or dead member of our species has 
ever exerted conscious control. That, we are told from the 
ranks of current-day biotechnology experts, is about to 
change dramatically. For the first time in our history we 
as a species have, as a result of evolution based on natural 
selection, reached the point where we are set to take 
our future evolution into our own hands and steer it in 
directions that we ourselves will consciously determine.
This means that we are about to radicalise the process 
of enhancement to which our species has always been 
subjected. The debate about post-humanism, about which 
this paper will provide an overview of, is firmly embedded 
in the wider bioethical and philosophical conversation 
about the nature, future, morality and implications of the 
phenomenon of human enhancement.
No other species on this planet has enhanced itself 
over the millennia as much as we have. From the moment 
we constructed the most rudimentary tools, or learned 
perfunctorily that we can use sounds as vehicles for 
communication, and that the communication potential 
of that activity is tenfold increased if we also externalise 
our language into written symbols, and thus objectify the 
contents of our minds in order to attain more clarity and 
more accuracy in terms of what we think and what we 
know – from these revolutionary beacons in the story of 
how we became what we today are, we have always and 
consistently enhanced ourselves. We have, for example, 
created institutions that enable us to act, not only as 
individuals, but as groups, tied by bonds of (initially) fear, 
but later also of survival, order, justice, knowledge and 
faith. We have, as another example, created technologies 
that enhanced the power of our limbs and our senses 
immeasurably – from the tools we used to cultivate the 
fields where we learned to grow our crops, to the cranes 
and escalators that we use to lift whatever is held down 
by the force of gravity. Our eyes and the visibility of 
the world were immeasurably enhanced by the advent 
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of telescopes, microscopes, television sets and radio-
telescopes. Our hearing, or power to make auditive sense 
of the world, was transformed by the telephone and the 
radio. Our mobility attained a completely new meaning 
the day we exchanged horses, donkeys, camels and 
elephants for bicycles, motor vehicles, aeroplanes and 
space-craft. Our powers of calculation and computation 
were revolutionised by computers whilst our earlier 
belief that reliable knowledge or information can only 
be attained through laborious and sustained study, is in 
this very day challenged to its core by arguably the most 
revolutionary manifestation of human enhancement yet: 
the Internet. To enhance ourselves is something we have 
always done. It is the hallmark of being human.
The question is: are we about to transform, not only the 
technologies and institutions that enable our seemingly 
unchanged bodies to live more comfortably in the world, 
but also those very bodies and minds themselves into a 
kind of super-species, the continuity of which with the 
rest of us is no longer self-evident? What is the potential 
of our penetration into, and resultant knowledge of, the 
human genome? Talk about “post-humans” is nowadays, 
by and large, the outcome of reflection, not on our ability 
to enhance our life circumstances, but specifically on the 
idea of biomedical enhancements. The latter is defined by 
Allen Buchanan as: “deliberate interventions, applying 
biomedical science, which aim to improve an existing 
capacity that most or all normal human beings typically 
have, or to create a new capacity, by acting directly on the 
body or brain.” (Buchanan, 2011).
The idea of super-humans is, of course, in itself 
not new. We know it from an avalanche of science 
fiction, epitomised by various larger than life super-hero 
characters. The big difference between traditional fantasies 
of super people and the current debate, is, however, the 
fact that the idea of posthumanism has now become 
a serious talking point of science. With the revolution 
in biomedical and genetic sciences, we have reached a 
point where fantasy and reality seem to move towards 
each other with accelerating speed. What else can be the 
explanation for top-level research universities such as 
Oxford and Cambridge, and many others in recent years, 
creating a number of eminent research centres to explore 
this very possibility? What has happened to justify such 
developments which, a mere decade or two ago, would 
have created the impression of utterly unfounded flights 
of fantasy, unworthy of serious academic or scientific 
attention?
Space constraints prevent a full exploration of the 
many possible valid answers to this question. However 
I would like to highlight two points. Firstly, take into 
account how we, living in a developed context in the year 
2013, would appear to ancestors of 100 or 200 years ago, 
should they be resurrected today. With our prowess in 
driving fancy cars, globe-trotting, spending most of our 
days in front of computer screens, not to mention the most 
unfathomable idea of all, the fact that we conduct the 
bulk of our communication through little hand-held bars 
called “cell-phones”; we would undoubtedly appear like a 
super-race to these ancestors. Now ask the question: if the 
world, and we with it, could have changed so much in so 
relatively short a time-span, what awaits us over the next 
century or two? In other words, if we extrapolate future 
rates of technological growth from the pace of growth as 
it has been manifested in the past, we are well justified 
to expect ever more rapidly growing technologies that 
might well impede on the nature of the beings that are 
their origin and that increasingly interact with artefacts of 
technological innovation.
We are, according to the posthumanists (more 
popularly called the “transhumanists”) unstoppably en 
route to the development of a new species. Someone like 
Max More claims that “humans are but a transitional stage 
standing between our animal heritage and our posthuman 
future” (More, in Tirosh-Samuelson, 2001, p.23). Nick 
Bostrom, the leading philosopher of transhumanism, 
defines transhumanism as: “a way of thinking about 
the future that is based on the premise that the human 
species in its current form does not represent the end of 
our development but rather a comparatively early phase” 
(Bostrom, 2003, p.26). This new species will emerge 
through technologies such as “genetic engineering, 
life-extending bio-sciences, intelligence intensifiers, 
smarter interfaces to swifter computers, neural-computer 
integration, world-wide data networks, virtual reality, 
intelligent agents, swift electronic communication, 
artificial intelligence, neuroscience, neural networks, 
artificial life, off-planet migration and molecular 
nanotechnology” (Tirosch-Samuelson, 2011, p.23-24). 
At some point the name homo sapiens may become 
be inappropriate for the new species that will emerge. 
Perhaps it will be replaced by robo sapiens.
Space constraints prohibit me from elaborating in 
detail the way in which this is thought to be achievable. 
It will suffice to briefly draw attention to one of the most 
remarkable of these posthuman manifestations on which 
serious research is currently being conducted, namely 
longevity or radical life-extension technologies. I refer in 
particular to the, for many people, outrageous claims of 
this technology’s most vocal current exponent, Aubrey de 
Grey, who identifies himself as a “biogerontologist” and 
is currently chief science officer of the SENS (Strategies 
for Engineered Negligible Senescence) Foundation in 
Cambridge. He claims that aging is no more than a wide-
spread, extremely destructive, yet avoidable cluster of 
diseases that could all be reversed or cured in view of 
extending our lifespan almost indefinitely. We can grow 
old without becoming aged. To quote De Grey himself: 
“Recent biotechnological progress indicates that many 
aspects of aging may indeed be effectively treatable 
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by regenerative medicine in the foreseeable future. We 
cannot yet know whether all aspects will be curable, 
but extensive scrutiny has failed to identify any definite 
exceptions. Therefore, at this point there is a significant 
chance that such therapies would postpone age-related 
decline by several years, if not more, which constitutes 
a clear case for allocating significant resources to the 
attempt to develop those therapies” (De Grey, 2011, p.67-
68). Virtually every disease or degeneration of the human 
body associated with the process of aging can, according 
to De Grey, be “reverse-engineered”. The great challenge 
is to arrest the process of aging, not at the equivalent of 
the bodily prowess of a 90 year old, but rather at that of 
a 40 year old. De Grey is highly confident that the first 
person to reach the age of 1000 has already been born, and 
furthermore, has high hopes that it will indeed be himself.
In the remainder of this paper, I will develop a few 
evaluative philosophical and moral perspectives on 
the idea of post – or trans – humanism. The first is the 
acknowledgement that, as already indicated, we have 
always enhanced ourselves as members of our species. 
To therefore be “against enhancement” in toto, as is 
seemingly the case with prominent philosophers such as 
Habermas (2005), Sandel (2003) and Fukuyama (2002), 
makes little sense; it is analogous to being “against 
technology” or “against globalisation” – attitudes that 
simply fail to come to grips with inevitable phenomena 
and trends of our current life-world. Sandel and others are 
particularly concerned that the phenomenon of biomedical 
enhancement, as increasingly foreseen and practised, 
is indicative of a morally unwarranted “obsession with 
mastery and perfection”. In as far as it is directed at the 
genetic manipulation of children, Sandel argues that 
biomedical enhancement is indicative of a refusal to 
“accept children as they are, as a gift” that we are not 
allowed to manipulate in our own or some idealised image 
(Sandel, 2003, p.80).
But these arguments are not credible. Are we not, 
always, educating our children, thereby doing our best 
to mould them into a fashion of desired beings that we 
inevitable choose? What is, in principle, the difference 
between education and enhancement? We resist disease 
– also genetic disease - with all our might, thereby 
acknowledging that we do not uncritically “accept” 
everything nature bestows on ourselves and our offspring 
from birth. “The given” that Sandel wishes us to accept 
includes Huntington’s chorea, cystic fibrosis and cancer. 
Must we “accept” these conditions? To enhance ourselves 
and our children is not to pursue a coherent blueprint 
for the future. Enhancements have in the past and will 
hopefully in the future proceed in a piecemeal manner, 
tinkering here and there, making small-step advances, 
analogous to the piecemeal mutations that, according to 
Darwin (1971, p.80-127), occur in the process of natural 
selection. There is no teleology that natural selection tries 
to fulfil. The point of enhancement is not mastery, but 
improvement.1
The second point I’d like to make is that, of course, 
science is not value-free. All evolution – also, and 
in particular, the evolution of henceforth controlling 
ourselves and steering our physical  and mental 
development in a direction we choose ourselves, is not 
necessarily good. What we can do, particularly in the 
future, is not necessarily what we should do. Science and 
technology can be miraculously advantageous instruments 
of social progress for ourselves and our world, as we 
have so often seen. But they can, as demonstrated by 
Auschwitz, Hiroshima and Chernobyl, be horrifically 
destructive forces that create unimaginable suffering. 
When we are told that it may one day be possible to 
utterly transform ourselves and our current species-type 
into one with inconceivable capabilities and powers, our 
sense of moral vigilance ought to be aroused anew.  We 
will have to sharpen every moral instinct that we possess 
in order to not only keep abreast of what is, and could be, 
occurring in the future; but also to evaluate whether such 
developments will be to our advantage and why. 
There are at the philosophical, psychological and 
moral levels serious critical questions to ask about the 
prospect of posthumanism. At the psychological level, 
aspects of what is being foreseen for transhumanism 
can be seriously questioned. Transhumanists are often 
inclined to work with a too fragmented, mechanical 
image of the human-being, disregarding the organic and 
integrated nature of the kind of being that we are. I refer 
here to the transhumanist idea that the decision regarding 
which capacities would be enhanced, should be left up to 
individuals themselves.  This implies that human beings, 
based upon their personal preferences, could pick and 
choose the qualities they would wish to enhance and that 
something like intelligence, for example, could be isolated 
and radically enhanced without at the same time requiring 
that other aspects of the human personality be considered. 
It would however be of scant value if we succeed in 
enhancing an individual to the level of being able to 
solve the most complex mathematical or engineering 
problems, but embed that intelligence in a personality 
that has not progressed beyond the idiosyncracies of a 
selfish adolescent.  Nicholas Agar correctly remarks in 
this regard: “[T]he human mind-brain is an exceedingly 
complex system and an increase in intelligence is but 
one among many effects produced by [a transhumanist] 
intervention…Naming one good outcome – increased 
intelligence together with an enlarged repertoire of 
experiences – and pronouncing the sum of [the] known 
and unknown consequences [of this intervention]  good is 
a bit like singling out a beneficial effect  of climate change 
– increased wheat production in Siberia – and forming an 
1 For a more extensive critical discussion of Sandel’s arguments, see 
Van Niekerk (2012): 589-590.
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optimistic opinion of climate change as a whole” (Agar, 
2011, p.138-139).
It is, thirdly, a pity that the possibility of radical life 
extension or increased longevity has captured so much 
attention and has thus tended to become most closely 
associated with public perceptions of posthumanism. 
To my mind, this possibility offers one of the least 
plausible claims regarding the possible benefits of 
posthumanism.  I cannot but agree with the well-known 
Oxford philosopher-ethicist Bernard Williams, who 
already in the 1970’s identified the probability of sheer 
boredom as arguably the most persuasive argument 
against the prospect of indefinite longevity (Williams, 
1973). If I were to last 1000 years, and we take 100 years 
as a reasonable duration for, e.g., a career, it would imply 
that I would have time for embarking on 10 different 
careers. I can see the fun in a second, or maybe a third 
career, but thereafter sustained career changes could 
become ridiculous and boring. Furthermore, if radical life 
extension is prone to be limited to a few, as it surely will 
be for a very long time, what would the implications be 
for the relationship between these few Methuselas2 and 
the rest of us? Could we ever be friends? Could we ever 
be taken seriously by people who have lived hundreds of 
years before us? Finally, there is much to be said for the 
idea that life acquires much of its meaning and urgency in 
view of the fact that we are finite and mortal. What is the 
sense of doing good, committing sacrifices for others and 
taking chances if the postponement of such actions has no 
consequences, and the opportunity for such actions could 
always come again? What do we live for if we live forever? 
In this regard, I am attracted to the following argument of 
Tirosh-Samuelson: “Since the human is an organism rather 
than a mechanical device, human beings undergo the cycle 
of birth, maturation, aging, and death, which exemplifies 
the rhythm of creation and the gift of life”.
It is self-evident that when we contemplate the 
possibility of transhumanism, a major moral concern is 
the issue of safety: will such a development be safe for 
not only those who are subjected to such interventions, 
but also for those who remain what they are and who 
have to co-exist with these new beings? I accept this 
concern. At the same time, concern about safety and 
risk is often proposed as justification for what Allen 
Buchanan calls “the simple conservative argument” – an 
argument that cannot be accepted without qualification. 
This argument claims that: “Biomedical enhancements, 
leading to transhumanists, carry extraordinary risks, and 
given how well off we already are (thanks in part to past 
enhancements) those risks are not worth taking. So even 
if we could have been wrong – indeed stupid – to have 
forgone the major historical enhancements, we should 
draw the line now” (Buchanan, 2011, p.55).
2 See Genesis 5:22-27 of the bible. According to this story, Methuse-
la was the man who lived to be the oldest ever – 969 years.
To this my reply is that it is hardly credible to assume 
that the risks of new enhancements – even the creation of 
a new species - will be greater than those of the past. Two 
examples may be noted.  Firstly, we have enhanced our 
ability to generate power immensely by nuclear power, 
but at the same time created the danger of destroying our 
entire civilization by that very same power. Secondly, we 
have enhanced our mobility immensely by air travel, and 
at the same time created unknown dangers of destructive 
global pandemics (e.g. SARS and Swine influenza which 
are most effectively spread by aviation).
Why should we therefore assume that “we have gone 
far enough”, i.e. that we are not in need of significantly 
more enhancements to sustain our own well-being and/
or extend that well-being to people in need of it? It is an 
inescapable fact that progress, particularly in science, 
technology and medicine, inevitably requires a measure 
of risk. Compare, for example, the risks taken by the first 
patients who received chemotherapy, the first receiver of 
a transplanted heart and the first astronauts. It is not for 
nothing that the US anthem sees the future as the property 
of the brave. 
We might nevertheless be very concerned about what 
the relationship could be between so-called “normal 
people” and the race of posthumans that the acquisition 
of power over our future evolution might yield. Is it 
conceivable that a modus vivendi will be found to manage 
peaceful and just co-existence between us and what might 
well turn out to be a “different human species”? Here we 
obviously enter the avenue of conjecture, and I don’t want 
to give the impression that I possess definitive answers to 
all the scenarios that we might imagine in this regard.  Let 
me nevertheless remind you of an interesting article by the 
Harvard bioethicist Daniel Wikler (2009), who raises the 
question as to whether, in a hypothetical future situation 
where very clever people have come about as a result of 
posthumanist technologies, it would be morally in order 
for these posthumans to act paternalistically towards the 
rest of us in a manner analogous to the way in which we 
act towards mentally disabled individuals and children.
The issue here would be whether it will be in order 
for them to infringe upon what we regard as our human 
right to competence (e.g. to make decisions pertaining to 
our own health care and lifestyles) on the basis of their 
superior knowledge and judgment. Wikler argues that the 
answer to this question depends on how we understand the 
notion of “competence”. There is one of two possibilities: 
Firstly, there is a relativistic view of competence: here, 
we could, for example, point out the relative difference 
in intellectual ability between statistically average 
people and the intellectually disabled, as well as to 
the corresponding (probable) difference in favourable 
outcomes of key decisions when made by these two 
categories of people. We could then develop a “Rule of 
Thumb” which stipulates that if the two groups’ IQs differ 
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by 28 points or more (irrespective of where on the overall 
scale the highest and lowest score falls); one group would 
be regarded as “smart” and the other as “dull”, and the 
first would be therefore considerably more competent.
Compare this to what Wikler calls a threshold concept 
of competence (or what Rawls would call a “range 
property”). In this case, that which determines that one 
person is competent and the other not, is not the relative 
difference between them in respect to intelligence, 
but rather on which side of an absolute threshold their 
intellectual capacities fall. Therefore: if you meet the 
minimum threshold (e.g. IQ 90), you are competent, 
irrespective of whether you score 90 or 140.
Whereas Wikler argues that a future group of 
super-humans probably will be morally justified to act 
paternalistically towards the unenhanced, Buchanan 
argues this matter in terms of a “threshold concept of 
human rights”. This means that such enhanced people will 
not have the right to infringe upon my human rights once 
I meet the basic threshold (Buchanan, 2011, p.212-217). I 
certainly prefer this latter argument.
To conclude, I see little wisdom in an attitude of 
either embracing or rejecting the idea of posthumanism 
in its totality. As a species, we have always enhanced 
ourselves. Why would it be problematic, in principle, to 
follow the logic and possibilities to more revolutionary 
destinies than what we may have thought possible in 
times before technology had attained its current and 
future capabilities? I think it is a mistake to elevate the 
notion of “human nature”, as we currently are familiar 
with that phenomenon, to a moral ideal or a moral 
desideratum. Why should it be morally required of us 
to maintain and preserve human nature as we currently 
know it, at all costs? As I have already mentioned: we are 
extremely different from our early ancestors, and we will 
continue to change in accordance with the nature of our 
predispositions as human beings. Furthermore: if we are 
to elevate “human nature” to the level of something that 
we are morally obliged to preserve at all costs, bear in 
mind that we are then compelled to accept and preserve 
the reality of human nature “warts and all”! Human 
nature, after all, is not only that which manifests itself in 
our ultimate human and moral role models, such as Jesus, 
Mohammed, Mother Theresa and Nelson Mandela. Part 
of the fabric of “human nature” is, unfortunately, also the 
likes of Stalin, Hitler and Jack the Ripper! If we believe 
that “human nature” is to be preserved in its current 
spectrum of varieties, they are part of the baggage we 
willfully have to take on board.
Of course we ought to be cautious of the possibility 
of creating a super-species whose set of morals might 
clash head-on with our own and who have the power and 
intelligence to disown the rest of us and plunge our world 
into greater chaos than it already knows. But there is 
also another possibility, namely, the possibility that these 
highly intelligent descendants of ours might immeasurably 
improve our world; and might even succeed in persuading 
the majority of us of a deeper and more profound 
meaning that reside in our values – an understanding of 
our professed values that might actually persuade the 
majority of us that it is not only necessary to believe in a 
better world, but that such a world is attainable through 
measures and initiatives that we are too selfish or stupid to 
realize or implement.
In particular, I would like to caution against bad 
arguments for skepticism about posthumanism such as 
those of Michael Sandel and Francis Fukuyama, whom I 
admire as political philosophers, but who disappoint me 
greatly as bioethicists. Add to them a very able thinker 
such as Nicholas Agar, who writes an excellent book about 
posthumanism, but then allows himself to flirt with the 
argument that we ought not to try and improve ourselves 
since we can only exert our good qualities in the presence 
of the possibility of acting badly, and that the good that 
is accomplished in the world requires the continuance of 
evil to provide it with its meaning and significance (Agar, 
2010, p.180-181). This kind of argument is a barely 
disguised effort to romanticize the presence and necessity 
of evil. It is but a small step from this kind of argument 
– which originates from a theodicy already developed by 
the church father Irenaeus3 in the second century A.D. – 
to the argument that claims that Hitler and the Holocaust 
were necessary to produce inspirational moral heroes 
such as Anne Frank and Alfred Schindler. I myself prefer 
the belief that we could entirely do without all the human 
monsters of history, and the possibility of transhumanism 
provides a new motivation for an ideal that is not bogus.
To conclude we may ask: is it wise to fool around with 
nature? Will nature not take its own unforeseen revenge? 
Does nature not know best? This is, of course, on the 
first level of analysis a silly question because we are, 
ever since we came into being, all the time impinging on 
nature and transforming it into a habitable environment 
for ourselves. That is what all technology, and medicine 
in particular, is about. Yet, drawing on an argument of 
Bostrom and Sandberg (2009), we might, for argument’s 
sake, assume for the time being that “nature knows 
best”. The question then arises why, if an enhancement 
is really urgently required for our species, has nature not 
provided it herself in the light of the wisdom of natural 
selection? Take, for example, the current-day urgent 
need for all people to possess a significantly elevated 
capacity to do mathematics. We all need it, and yet we 
are all witness to our education system’s lamentable 
and seemingly sustained inability to deliver this skill; 
hence the ever-growing industry of extra curriculum 
mathematics classes! Why has nature not produced 
this skill in us through natural selection? The answer is 
3 For a discussion of Irenaeus’s argument, see Van Niekerk  (2005: 
613-617).
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simple. About 10 000 years ago, when our ancestors lived 
in caves and were hunter-gatherers, they required very 
little mathematics to survive. To count to ten, was more 
than ample! It took a mere 10 000 years from that time 
until now – a time in which we direly need mathematics. 
Ten thousand years in evolutionary time, is hardly a blip 
on the radar screen; it is way too brief a period to enable 
“Nature” to succeed in getting us to successfully select 
for mathematically skilled children. Bostrom and Sandel 
have, in light of this, developed what they called a moral 
“heuristic” which now, to my mind rightfully, claims that 
when we are experiencing a need that nature has not had 
the evolutionary time to develop in us, we are more than 
justified to seek it through other means – even if that 
means is the prowess of cognitively enhanced people who 
have outgrown our general mathematical incapacity and 
who might, in that way, improve our world.
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